1. Prerequisites
- Alert, incident, or investigation involving suspicious outbound network activity (e.g. C2 / beaconing, data exfiltration, unauthorised transfer, post-exploitation comms, reverse shell)
- Access to firewall logs
- Access to proxy logs
- Access to DNS logs
- Access to NetFlow or network telemetry
- Access to EDR telemetry
- Access to SIEM
- Source IP addresses, hostnames, or user accounts associated with the investigation
- Time window for suspected activity
2. Step-by-Step Instructions
-
Identify Suspected Assets
- Identify affected:
- Endpoints
- Servers
- User accounts
- Cloud workloads
- Document all known indicators associated with the investigation.
- Identify affected:
-
Establish Investigation Timeline
- Determine:
- Initial alert time
- Earliest known suspicious activity
- Last observed activity
- Define the analysis window.
- Determine:
-
Review Outbound Network Connections
- Review network telemetry for:
- External IP addresses
- Domains
- URLs
- Destination countries
- Identify all outbound communication from affected assets.
- Review network telemetry for:
-
Identify Unusual Outbound Activity
- Look for:
- Large data transfers (potential exfiltration)
- Beaconing patterns - regular intervals, jitter, periodic callbacks (potential C2)
- Long-lived or persistent outbound connections (potential reverse shell or C2)
- Connections to newly registered or typosquatted domains
- Transfers or callbacks outside business hours
- Unusual destinations or destination countries
- Rare protocols
- New or previously unseen connections
- Document suspicious findings.
- Look for:
-
Analyse Protocols and Traffic Patterns
- Review use of:
- HTTPS
- DNS (including tunnelling patterns - high-volume, unusual TXT/NULL records)
- SFTP / SCP / FTP
- SMB over VPN
- Cloud storage services
- Remote administration tools
- ICMP / unusual port usage
- Determine whether the traffic pattern is consistent with:
- Bulk data transfer (exfiltration)
- Low-volume callback (C2 / beaconing)
- Interactive session (reverse shell, remote admin)
- Review use of:
-
Review Destination Infrastructure
- Assess:
- Reputation of destination IPs
- Reputation of destination domains
- Hosting providers
- Geographic location
- Identify indicators of malicious or suspicious infrastructure.
- Assess:
-
Correlate with Endpoint Activity
- Review EDR telemetry for:
- File access activity, archive creation, compression utilities, cloud sync tools (potential exfiltration staging)
- Suspicious process execution, parent-child chains, command-line activity (potential C2 / post-exploitation)
- Persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, services, run keys, cron, launch agents)
- Process injection or in-memory execution indicators
- Determine whether outbound traffic correlates with data collection / staging, C2 / beaconing, or post-exploitation activity.
- Review EDR telemetry for:
-
Determine the Nature and Impact of the Outbound Activity
- If exfiltration suspected, estimate:
- Volume and duration of transferred data
- Number of affected assets
- Potential sensitivity of impacted data
- If C2 / beaconing suspected, identify:
- Attacker infrastructure (IPs, domains, ASNs)
- Beaconing tempo and jitter
- Persistence indicators
- Likely malware family or implant based on traffic pattern
- If reverse shell / interactive access suspected, identify:
- Session duration and source
- Commands executed during the session
- Files accessed or transferred
- Document findings and confidence level.
- If exfiltration suspected, estimate:
-
Document Findings
- Record:
- Source systems
- Source users
- Destination infrastructure
- Transfer methods
- Transfer volumes
- Timeline of events
- Preserve relevant evidence.
- Record:
-
Escalate and Hand Off
- Provide findings to the Incident Commander and Technical Lead.
- Escalate based on findings:
- Exfiltration confirmed → Data Staging Investigation, Sensitive Data Impact Assessment, Outbound Transfer Blocking
- C2 / beaconing confirmed → Malware Analysis, Persistence Mechanism Hunt, Host Isolation
- Reverse shell / interactive access confirmed → Host Isolation, Session Token Revocation, Account Lockdown
- Update the incident record with all findings.
3. Post-Action
- Ensure all identified destinations are documented.
- Ensure all evidence sources are preserved.
- Attach relevant logs and telemetry to the incident record.
- Provide a summary of suspected exfiltration activity, affected assets, and identified destinations.
- Participate in subsequent investigation and containment activities as required.
Contributor
Vishal Thakur GitHub: https://github.com/malienist
Contributed to the Arcana Incident Response Documentation Framework.
