1. Prerequisites
- DLP alert or user report of suspected data loss
- Endpoint telemetry (file access, file write, process execution)
- Network / proxy / CASB telemetry (outbound transfers, web uploads, cloud storage activity)
- Email gateway logs (attachments sent, recipients)
- SaaS / cloud storage audit logs (file share, download, external link creation)
- User and asset information for the actor involved
Required Tools:
- DLP platform
- EDR platform
- SIEM
- Email gateway
- CASB / proxy
- SaaS / cloud storage admin console
- Asset and identity inventory
2. Step-by-Step Instructions
Common Failure Modes
- Closing the alert as false positive without confirming the actor is the genuine user
- Treating "blocked by DLP" as the end of the investigation when other channels may still be in use
- Reviewing only the alerting transfer and missing related transfers in the same window
- Failing to classify the data before assigning severity
-
Validate Alert Authenticity
- Determine:
- Trigger source (DLP rule, user report, third-party notification, SIEM correlation)
- Trigger reason (rule matched, file pattern, destination, volume, user-reported observation)
- Whether the transfer was blocked, allowed, or monitor-only
- Whether the alert has known false-positive history for this rule / user / channel
- Determine:
-
Identify the Actor and Asset
- Collect:
- Username and email of the actor
- Hostname, IP, and OS of the originating device
- Logged-in user at the time of the event
- Account type (employee, contractor, service account, shared mailbox)
- Device managed / unmanaged status
- Privilege level and group memberships
- Collect:
-
Identify the Transfer Path
- Determine:
- Channel used (e.g. web upload, email attachment, cloud storage sync, USB / removable media, IM / chat upload, code-repo push, print, screenshot)
- Destination (domain, recipient address, cloud tenant, removable device ID, repo URL)
- Whether the destination is sanctioned, unsanctioned, or unknown
- Whether the destination is internal, external, or personal (e.g. personal email, personal cloud drive)
- Determine:
-
Identify the Data
- Determine:
- File names, file types, and file paths
- File size and file count
- Data classification (public, internal, confidential, regulated)
- Whether the data contains PII, PCI, PHI, source code, customer data, credentials, or other regulated/sensitive content
- Source of the data (which system, database, or repository it originated from)
- Determine:
-
Determine Whether the Activity Is Human or Automated
- Determine:
- Process and command line that initiated the transfer
- Parent process (browser, mail client, sync agent, script, unknown binary)
- Whether the action was performed interactively by the user or by automation / malware
- Whether the actor was authenticated and active on the device at the time
- Where a user is identified, contact them out-of-band to confirm whether the activity is legitimate
- Determine:
-
Assess Scope
- Review:
- Other transfers by the same actor in the incident window (same destination, same data, other channels)
- Other actors transferring the same data or to the same destination
- Other DLP alerts on the same rule / channel / destination across the environment
- Sign-in and session activity for the actor for signs of account compromise
- Review:
-
Determine Severity and Next Playbook
- Assess:
- Sensitivity and volume of data involved
- Whether the transfer was blocked or completed
- Whether the actor is the genuine user, a compromised account, or malware
- Whether the destination is attacker-controlled, personal, or sanctioned-but-misused
- Assess:
3. Post-Action
- Ensure trigger source, actor, transfer path, data classification, scope findings, and verdict are documented in the incident ticket
Contributor
Jayden Vo
GitHub: https://github.com/jayden-vo
Contributed to the Arcana Incident Response Documentation Framework.
