1. Purpose & Scope
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Purpose:
To describe the incident response steps for a malware compromise on corporate workstations, servers, or cloud hosts.
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Scope:
Applies to all endpoint malware incidents across the organisation, including:
- Commodity malware infections
- Initial access malware (loaders, droppers)
- Remote access trojans (RATs)
- Persistence-based compromise
- Malware-assisted lateral movement
2. Incident Identification & Criteria
Incident Type: Endpoint Malware Infection
Trigger Conditions:
Initiate this playbook when any of the following occur:
- EDR malware detection
- Suspicious process execution observed
- Known malicious file hash identified on a host
- RAT / C2 beaconing detected
- Persistence mechanism identified (run keys, scheduled tasks, services, launch agents, cron)
- User reports suspicious endpoint behaviour
- Malware sandbox detonation confirms malicious activity
Severity Levels:
| Severity | Description |
|---|---|
| Sev 3 | Isolated malware detection with no confirmed execution |
| Sev 2 | Confirmed malware execution on a single endpoint with no observed propagation |
| Sev 1 | Malware with credential theft, lateral movement capability, or impacting a business-critical system |
| Sev 0 | Widespread malware propagation or enterprise-wide compromise |
3. Roles & Responsibilities
- Incident Commander: Coordinates and leads the response to the malware incident; drives decisions and timelines; ensures containment, communications, and remediation actions are executed.
- Communications Lead: Manages internal and external communications, executive updates, and stakeholder messaging.
- Incident Responder/Forensic Analyst: Performs forensic analysis of impacted hosts, payload analysis, persistence hunts, identifies patient zero, and preserves evidence.
- Other Roles:
- Identity & Access Team: Supports credential reset, session revocation, and privileged account review where credential exposure is identified.
- Network/Infrastructure Team: Executes host isolation, network segmentation, and supports lateral-movement containment.
- Endpoint/Platform Team: Supports endpoint rebuild, re-imaging, and validation prior to return to service.
4. Initial Actions
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Immediate Steps:
- Perform EDR alert triage to validate the detection and assess immediate risk
Decision Point:
- If false positive โ close with documentation
- If true positive โ continue
- Isolate the impacted endpoint to prevent additional payload execution and lateral movement
- Notify Incident Response leadership and assign roles
- Preserve volatile evidence where feasible (avoid additional shutdowns or reboots unless required)
Warning: Do NOT assume malware activity is isolated to a single endpoint until lateral movement, persistence mechanisms, and credential exposure have been assessed across adjacent systems. Malware infections frequently represent broader compromise activity.
- Perform EDR alert triage to validate the detection and assess immediate risk
5. Investigation & Analysis
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Evidence Collection:
- For all newly identified infected hosts:
- collect the following host telemetry over the incident window:
- Process execution - focus on suspicious parent-child chains, LOLBin usage, and unsigned/unknown binaries
- File system events - payload drops, unsigned executables in user/temp directories, persistence file writes
- Script & interpreter activity - encoded/obfuscated PowerShell, bash, zsh, python; LOLBins
- Network connections - outbound beacons, unusual DNS lookups, connections to unknown destinations
- Authentication / logon - lateral movement over RDP, SSH, SMB
- Persistence - scheduled tasks, cron, services/daemons, launch agents, autoruns
- ๐ RB-EVIDENCE-002: Host-Based Log Acquisition
- capture a full memory snapshot to preserve volatile artefacts before any reboot, reimage, or shutdown
- collect the following host telemetry over the incident window:
- For all newly identified infected hosts:
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Analysis Steps:
- Reconstruct the process tree to identify the execution source, parent process, and command-line arguments
Decision Point: For each identified initial access vector, run the post-detection phases (Analysis โ Recovery) of the relevant playbook concurrently alongside this one:
- Phishing โ PB-001: Phishing & Credential Theft
- Account takeover โ PB-004: Account Takeover
- Zero-day exploitation โ PB-018: Zero-Day Response
- Known/patched vulnerability exploited โ PB-017: Vulnerability Response
- Analyse the malware payload to identify family, behaviour, capabilities (credential theft, lateral movement, exfiltration, encryption), and indicators of compromise
Decision Point:
- If ransomware behaviour identified โ run the post-detection phases (Analysis โ Recovery) of PB-002: Ransomware concurrently alongside this playbook.
- If data exfiltration identified โ run the post-detection phases (Analysis โ Recovery) of PB-005: Data Exfiltration concurrently alongside this playbook.
- Perform memory analysis to identify injected processes, in-memory persistence, and active malware artefacts
- Hunt for persistence mechanisms across the host (scheduled tasks, services, registry run keys, launch agents/daemons, cron jobs)
- Document findings, attack timeline, and indicators of compromise (IOCs)
6. Containment, Eradication & Recovery
Warning: Do NOT begin recovery activities until:
- Containment is verified
- Persistence mechanisms are identified and removed
- Credential exposure has been assessed
- Propagation paths are understood
Premature recovery may result in reinfection or repeated compromise.
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Containment Actions:
- Short-term (immediate) containment:
- Isolate impacted hosts to prevent additional payload execution and lateral movement
- Long-term (identity) containment:
- Where credential exposure is identified, revoke active sessions and reset credentials for affected accounts
Decision Point:
- If privileged account compromise confirmed โ immediate enterprise-wide escalation.
- Short-term (immediate) containment:
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Eradication and Recovery Steps:
- Rebuild impacted hosts from known-good images and validate before reconnection
- ๐ RB-RECOVERY-002: Clean System Rebuild - for per-host rebuild, hardening, and validation
- Restore user access in a controlled manner
- Monitor for reinfection and reintroduce systems gradually
Decision Point:
- If reinfection activity observed โ halt recovery activities immediately and return to containment.
- Rebuild impacted hosts from known-good images and validate before reconnection
7. Communication & Escalation
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Internal Communication:
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Notify affected users and business units
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Provide regular incident updates to leadership and impacted teams
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Issue org-wide advisory if propagation is broad or critical services are impacted
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External Communication:
- Engage Legal/Privacy to assess regulatory and breach notification obligations where credential or data exposure is suspected
- Notify customers, regulators, and partners as directed by Legal
- Coordinate all external messaging with Communications Lead and Legal
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Escalation Criteria:
Condition Escalate To Phishing identified as initial access vector PB-001: Phishing & Credential Theft Account takeover identified as initial access vector PB-004: Account Takeover Zero-day vulnerability exploited as initial access vector PB-018: Zero-Day Response Known/patched vulnerability exploited as initial access vector PB-017: Vulnerability Response Ransomware behaviour identified PB-002: Ransomware Data exfiltration confirmed PB-005: Data Exfiltration Enterprise-wide propagation or critical infrastructure impact PB-019: Major Security Incident Management / Executive escalation
8. Post-Incident Activities
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Lessons Learned:
- Schedule and conduct a Post-Incident Review (PIR)
- Document what went well and what needs improvement
- Review control failures (detection, segmentation, privileged access, endpoint hardening)
- Identify and close detection gaps
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Documentation Updates:
- Update this playbook, linked runbooks, and KB articles to reflect lessons learned
- Update detections and threat intelligence based on observed TTPs
9. References & Linked Resources
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Playbooks:
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Runbooks:
- RB-TRIAGE-002: EDR Alert Triage
- RB-CONTAIN-004: Host Isolation
- RB-CONTAIN-005: Session Token Revocation
- RB-ANALYSIS-006: Process Tree Analysis
- RB-ANALYSIS-014: Malware Persistence Mechanism Hunt
- RB-ANALYSIS-015: Malware Analysis
- RB-ANALYSIS-016: Memory Analysis
- RB-EVIDENCE-001: Memory Acquisition
- RB-EVIDENCE-002: Host-Based Log Acquisition
- RB-RECOVERY-002: Clean System Rebuild
- RB-RECOVERY-003: User Recovery & Access Restoration
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SOPs:
10. Appendices
Contributor
Vishal Thakur GitHub: https://github.com/malienist
Contributed to the Arcana Incident Response Documentation Framework.
